I got myself a Yubikey recently, and I wanted to use it as a nice convenience to:

1. Grant me sudo privileges
2. Unlock my session
3. Decrypt my LUKS-encrypted disk

I've only managed to do the first two, since they both rely on Linux Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM). Luckily for me, one of PAM's modules supports U2F, the standard Yubikeys rely on.

First I need to install pam-u2f to add U2F support to PAM, and pamu2fcfg to configure my key.

$ sudo rpm-ostree install pam-u2f pamu2fcfg

Since I'm running an immutable OS I need to reboot, and then I can create the correct directory and file to dump an U2F key into it.

$ mkdir -p ~/.config/Yubico
$ pamu2fcfg > ~/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys

Then I make sure to have a root session open in case I lock myself out of sudoers.

$ sudo su
#

In a different terminal, I can edit the sudoers file to add this line

#%PAM-1.0
auth       sufficient   pam_u2f.so cue openasuser
auth       include      system-auth
account    include      system-auth
password   include      system-auth
session    optional     pam_keyinit.so revoke
session    required     pam_limits.so
session    include      system-auth

I save this file and open a new terminal. I type in sudo vi and it asks me to touch my FIDO authenticator before opening vi! If I touch the Yubikey, it indeed opens vi with root privileges.

Let's break down the line:

• auth for authentication
• sufficient passing this authentication challenge is enough (it's not an additional factor of authentication)
• pam_u2f.so the module we load is for U2F, the standard Yubikeys use
• cue print "Please touch the FIDO authenticator." when the user needs to authenticate
• openasuser to fetch the authentication file without root privileges

It's also possible to use it to unlock my session, but it would be a bit reckless to allow anyone with my Yubikey to log into my laptop. If my backpack gets stolen and it has both my Yubikey and my laptop, anyone can log in.

It's possible to make the login screen require either my user password, or all of

• The Yubikey itself
• The PIN of the Yubikey
• Me to touch the Yubikey

If someone fails more than three times to enter the correct PIN, the Yubikey will lock itself and require a PUK to be unlocked. This gives me an additional layer of security, and it's more convenient than having to type a full length passphrase.

I've added the following line to /etc/pam.d/greetd (the greeter I use):

#%PAM-1.0
auth       sufficient  pam_u2f.so cue openasuser pinverification=1 userpresence=1
auth       substack    system-auth
[...]

[!warning] I can lose my Yubikey

I use my Yubikey as a nice convenience to set up a weaker PIN while not compromising too much on security. I use it instead of a password, no in addition to it.

Since I can lose or break my Yubikey and I don't want to buy two of them, I make the U2F login sufficient but not required . This means I can still fallback to password authentication if I lose my Yubikey.

Finally, DankMaterialShell uses its own lockscreen manager too. I still want to be able to fallback to password authentication if need be, so I'll configure it to accept U2F OR the password, not both.

This means that the lockscreen will call /etc/pam.d/dankshell-u2f to know what to do when the screen is locked. Since this file doesn't exist, I can create it with the following content.

#%PAM-1.0
auth sufficient pam_u2f.so cue openasuser pinverification=1 userpresence=1

I need a fallback for when I don't have my Yubikey, so I also create the one for this occasion

#%PAM-1.0
auth include system-auth

Finally, I have a consistent setup where both my login and lock screen require me to plug my key, enter its PIN and touch it, or enter my full password. When it comes to sudo, I can only touch my key without requiring an PIN.

My next quest will be to use my Yubikey to unlock my LUKS-encrypted disk.